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PROTECTING PREGNANT WOMEN: A
GUIDE TO SUCCESSFULLY CHALLENGING
CRIMINAL CHILD ABUSE PROSECUTIONS
OF PREGNANT DRUG ADDICTS
KRISTA STONE-MANISTA*
This Comment is intended to enable advocates for pregnant women to
challenge the impermissible and unconstitutional prosecutions of pregnant
drug users for criminal child abuse and endangerment. The Comment
surveys the history of such prosecutions, and considers the policy
justifications for them, before turning to an analysis of the frameworks that
state appellate and supreme courts have applied in holding that these
prosecutions may not proceed under various state laws. In summarizing
the various challenges that may be brought to criminal prosecutions of
pregnant drug addicts, this Comment illuminates the strategies that have
been successful in previous cases, and offers various notes for those
challenging future prosecutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Use of illegal drugs by addicted women during their pregnancies poses
a significant public health problem.' Since the late 1970s, state prosecutors
* J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2009; M.A., University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2002; B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2001. I
would like to thank the 2008-2009 Editorial Board and Staff of the Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology for all of their work throughout the year, and to thank my family for their
love and support.
1 Public concern over the use of drugs by pregnant women became widespread after the
1988 release of a study conducted by the National Association for Perinatal Addiction
Research and Education suggesting that as many as 375,000 newborns per year faced
potential health damage resulting from pre-natal drug exposure. Jane E. Brody, Widespread
Abuse of Drugs by Pregnant Women Is Found, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1988, at Al. A more
recent survey conducted by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Statistics
Administration, a division of the Department of Health and Human Services, reported that in
2004-2005, 97,000 pregnant women between the ages of fifteen and forty-four had used
some form of illicit drug in the month prior to the survey. In comparison, 5,836,000 non-
pregnant women in the same age range used illicit drugs in that same time period. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., RESULTS FROM THE 2005 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND
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seeking to punish these women for their drug use have made the problem a
complex legal one as well.2 Prosecutors bring criminal charges against
pregnant women who use illicit drugs under a wide range of state statutes,
including but not limited to those governing criminal child abuse,3 criminal
child mistreatment,4 and attempted first-degree intentional homicide.5
State appellate courts have almost uniformly found that criminal
prosecutions of pregnant women for the effects of their drug use on their
fetuses are impermissible.6 However, prosecutors around the country
HEALTH: DETAILED TABLES tbl.7.69A (2006), available at http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/
nsduh/2k5nsduh/tabs/2k5TabsCover.pdf.
2 It is difficult to determine exactly when the practice of prosecuting pregnant drug users
under state child abuse or endangerment statutes became common. The first such case heard
by a state appellate court was Reyes v. Superior Court. 144 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Ct. App. 1977).
The first scholarly discussion of the issue was published in 1983. John A. Robertson,
Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L.
REV. 405, 439 (1983) (arguing that Reyes was wrongly decided since the court had failed to
consider the post-natal effects of the mother's pre-natal drug abuse).
3 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993) (upholding convictions
for possession of a controlled substance and of drug paraphernalia, but vacating conviction
for criminal child abuse).
4 See, e.g., State v. Dunn, 916 P.2d 952 (Wash. 1996) (affirming trial court's dismissal of
criminal mistreatment charges).
5 See, e.g., State v. J.Z., 596 N.W.2d 490 (Wis. 1999) (reversing an order that had denied
a motion to dismiss charges of attempted homicide and first-degree reckless injury).
6 This Comment uses the medically appropriate term "fetus" to refer to the "the unborn
offspring . . . in humans from nine weeks after fertilization until birth." DORLAND'S
ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 684 (30th ed. 2003). As a general rule, scholars who
advocate a limited view of fetal rights in favor of an expanded view of pregnant women's
rights consistently use the medical terms for the various stages of pregnancy, and are careful
to refer to women who have not yet given birth as "pregnant women," rather than as
"mothers." See, e.g., Pamala Harris, Note, Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant
Women: The Balancing of Maternal and Fetal Rights, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 133, 135-36
(2001) ("[A] competent woman's choice to refuse to submit to medical treatment must
always be honored even where her choice may be harmful to her fetus. A pregnant woman
must be afforded the same rights as if she were not pregnant."). Scholars who prefer fetal
rights to women's rights generally use less scientific terms such as "unborn child," and refer
to a woman who has not yet given birth as a "mother." See, e.g., James Denison, Note, The
Efficacy and Constitutionality of Criminal Punishment for Maternal Substance Abuse, 64 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1104, 1105 (1991) ("Courts already recognize rights of the unborn in many
civil law contexts, including actions against the plaintiffs' mothers, making clear that a
woman's control over her body is no longer inviolable." (internal citations omitted)). This
Comment takes the former view of women's rights, rather than the latter, and therefore uses
the former terminology. Cf Kenneth A. DeVille & Loretta M. Kopelman, Fetal Protection
in Wisconsin's Revised Child Abuse Law: Right Goal, Wrong Remedy, 27 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 332, 334-35 (1999) (arguing that "defining a fetus from conception as a 'child' ...
blurs the significant difference between the previously unenforceable interests possessed by
the fetus and the very real interests possessed by an ex utero child").
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continue to bring these cases.7 In September of 2007, a Missouri appellate
court dismissed child endangerment charges brought against a woman who
had used marijuana and methamphetamines during her pregnancy.' The
court, applying canons of statutory construction, found that Missouri's child
endangerment statute did not specifically prohibit conduct that had occurred
during pregnancy and thus was harmful only to a fetus and not to a living
child.9 In 2007 and 2008, eight women in one Alabama jurisdiction
(population 37,000) were prosecuted in an eighteen-month period for drug
use during pregnancy) ° The local prosecutor, referring to the need to
protect "the child-to-be" from prenatal drug use, made use of a statute
criminalizing "chemical endangerment of [a] child" that "was primarily
intended to protect youngsters from exposure to methamphetamine
laboratories.""
Consideration of legislative intent, and analysis of other rules of
statutory interpretation, are among several grounds upon which state
appellate courts have dismissed prosecutions of pregnant drug users. This
Comment is intended to provide a general overview of these grounds, and
of other methods which may be used by advocates for pregnant women to
challenge these prosecutions. To that end, Part II of this Comment surveys
state court decisions and scholarly analyses related to prosecutions of
pregnant women, and identifies strategies that have proven successful in
past cases. Part II also offers an in-depth case study of one successful
challenge to a prosecution of a pregnant woman.
State prosecutors and pro-prosecution legal scholars justify these
prosecutions with a wide range of policy arguments. Part III of this
Comment analyzes and responds to many such justifications, providing
arguments related to the failure of fetal abuse prosecutions to deter or
prevent drug abuse during pregnancy, provide appropriate punishment to
women deserving of such, or achieve improvements in maternal or fetal
health outcomes.
Most state courts that have considered the permissibility of criminal
child abuse or endangerment prosecutions of pregnant women have
addressed the issue within the frameworks of statutory interpretation and
7 See, e.g., Marie Szaniszlo et al., Pregnant Mom Busted for Heroin; Endangerment
Charges Eyed, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 5, 2007, at NEWS 2 ("Prosecutors are wading into the
state's murky child endangerment law to determine if it applies to a nine-months-pregnant
woman busted for allegedly shooting up heroin ... ").
8 State v. Wade, 232 S.W.3d 663 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
9 Id. at 664-65.
10 Adam Nossiter, Rural Alabama County Cracks Down on Pregnant Drug Users, N.Y.




legislative intent." Part IV of this Comment analyzes these frameworks
and their applications in this context. These prosecutions, brought under
pre-existing statutes not written with the problem of prenatal drug exposure
specifically in mind, must be distinguished from prosecutions brought
under newly enacted state statutes instituting criminal penalties for pregnant
women who use drugs.1 3 Although the new laws pose significant problems
of their own, this Comment focuses on criminal prosecutions brought under
general statutes not aimed specifically at the conduct of pregnant women.
Statutory interpretation challenges to the prosecutions of pregnant women
under these generic child abuse statutes generally begin, and frequently end,
with a consideration of the plain text of the given statute.1 4 Other canons of
statutory construction, such as the rule of lenity 15 and the advisement to
avoid constitutional conflicts,1 6 also weigh heavily in favor of the dismissal
of charges against addicted pregnant women. In addition, state appellate
courts frequently consider whether it was the intent of the state legislature,
in enacting a given statute, to allow prosecutions for actions of a pregnant
woman before the birth of her child.
17
There are also a number of constitutional considerations at issue in the
analysis of these prosecutions, as discussed in Part V of this Comment.
One is the requirement of fair notice, a central prerequisite for criminal
prosecutions that is based in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and
12 See, e.g., Reinesto v. State, 894 P.2d 733, 735 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (applying rules of
statutory interpretation and holding that Arizona's child abuse statute did not cover prenatal
conduct); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Ky. 1993) (dismissing, on
legislative intent grounds, charges brought under Kentucky's criminal child abuse statute);
State v. Dunn, 916 P.2d 952, 954 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a fetus was not a
"child" falling within the Washington criminal child mistreatment statute).
13 Wisconsin, South Dakota, and South Carolina were the first three states to enact so-
called "cocaine mom" statutes. The statutes allow pregnant women to be taken into custody
and forced to either undergo mandatory drug rehabilitation or remain incarcerated until the
end of their pregnancies. See Christa J. Richer, Note, Fetal Abuse Law: Punitive Approach
and the Honorable Status of Motherhood, 50 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1127, 1132-33 (2000)
(providing citations to the relevant statutes).
14 See infra notes 99-113 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 115-123 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 124-127 and accompanying text.
17 See infra Part IV.B. Statutes designed to criminalize child abuse or endangerment,
which generally do not include provisions for acts causing prenatal harm, should be
distinguished from laws specifically designed to advance the state's interest in protecting
pregnant women against acts of violence. For an excellent overview of the various state
approaches to this problem, see Sandra L. Smith, Note, Fetal Homicide: Woman or Fetus as
Victim? A Survey of Current State Approaches and Recommendations for Future State
Application, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1845 (2000).
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Fourteenth Amendments. i8 Courts have noted that applying a child abuse
statute that does not clearly criminalize prenatal conduct to a pregnant
woman violates constitutional due process requirements. 19 Advocates for
pregnant women also argue that these criminal prosecutions violate the
Fourteenth Amendment requirement that no State may "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,, 20 either because
they represent violations of gender-based equal protection or because they
have a biased intent and disparate impact on racial minorities. As other
scholars have extensively considered this issue,2' this Comment will not
address it at length; nonetheless, advocates are reminded of its importance
as a central line of constitutional challenge to prosecutions. This Comment
also does not analyze the Fourth Amendment22 barriers to these
prosecutions, which have been addressed by the United States Supreme
Court in Ferguson v. Charleston23 and by many other commentators,24 but
advocates seeking to challenge criminal prosecutions of pregnant women
should consider those issues as well.
The purpose of this Comment, therefore, is to provide pregnant women
and their advocates with a set of tools that may be used to challenge
18 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person may be
"deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V,
cl. 3. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends this requirement to the
States: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
19 Reinesto v. State, 894 P.2d 733, 734 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
20 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
21 See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND
THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 172-80 (Pantheon Books 1997); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing
Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104
HARv. L. REV. 1419 (1991) (arguing that the punishment of black drug addicts who choose to
carry their pregnancies to term violates equal protection rights because such punishment
stems from, and perpetuates, racial stereotypes).
22 U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 1 ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated ... ").
23 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (holding that a state hospital policy utilizing urine tests to obtain
evidence of maternity patients' cocaine use for law enforcement purposes was an
unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
24 See, e.g., Erin F. Barton, Comment, What About My Right to Privacy? Where the
Court Went Wrong in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 261 (2001)
(arguing that while reaching the correct result, the Court had failed to address the compelling
right-to-privacy issues at stake in the case); Brigitte M. Nahas, Comment, Drug Tests,
Arrests & Fetuses: A Comment on the U.S. Supreme Court's Narrow Opinion in Ferguson v.
City of Charleston, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 105, 106 (2001) (arguing that while the Court
was correct in concluding that the policy at issue in Ferguson violated the Fourth
Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court's "special needs"
analysis was vague and incomplete).
2009]
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impermissible and unconstitutional criminal prosecutions brought against
pregnant women under state child abuse or endangerment laws or similar
statutes. After providing a historical overview, this Comment analyzes the
policy arguments for and against these prosecutions. It then surveys past
state appellate court decisions and discusses the various methods that
advocates have successfully used to challenge prosecutions of pregnant
women. This Comment concludes with a discussion of the constitutional
implications of these prosecutions, focusing primarily on the violations of
fair notice and equal protection requirements that are inherent in such cases.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. EARLY CASES AND GENERAL TRENDS
In the late 1970s, state prosecutors began to prosecute pregnant women
who used illegal drugs or alcohol under state child abuse or endangerment
statutes, sometimes adding charges for drug trafficking or provision of
drugs to a minor.2 5 One of the first such prosecutions occurred in 1977,
when the State of California charged a pregnant heroin user with felony
child endangerment.26  Although the defendant's twins had suffered
withdrawal symptoms and other signs of heroin addiction as newborns, the
California Court of Appeals held that the state child endangerment statute
did not extend to conduct occurring before a child's birth2 7
25 These prosecutions likely reflect the merger, and in a sense the personification, of two
key social concerns that surfaced in this general time frame. The first of these was the
beginning of a movement to establish fetal rights in order to undermine a woman's right to
have an abortion, which the Supreme Court recognized in 1973; the second was mounting
concern over the rising epidemic of drug abuse, particularly crack cocaine abuse, in the
United States. See Janet Ashley Murphy & Robert A. Pugsley, Successful Pregnancy
Prevention Program for Addicts Remains Under Siege, 5 J.L. Soc'Y 155, 157-72 (2003)
(examining how the so-called crack baby crisis "transformed from a social and legal
nightmare into a public health problem" and discussing a program, challenged by
reproductive rights advocates, that offered drug-addicted women monetary incentives to
undergo sterilization or use long-term forms of birth control such as Norplant); Andrea
Sachs et al., Here Come the Pregnancy Police: Mothers of Drug-Exposed Infants Face Legal
Punishment, TIME, May 22, 1989, at 104 (surveying early prosecutions of pregnant women
for drug use during pregnancy and noting the "fear that the real goal in these cases may be an
unspoken one: an end run around the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark abortion case"). See
generally LAURA E. G6MEZ, MISCONCEIVING MOTHERS: LEGISLATORS, PROSECUTORS, AND
THE POLITICS OF PRENATAL DRUG ExPosuRE (1997) (chronicling the rise of public concern
over so-called crack babies, describing the legislative process through which the supposed
epidemic became a social problem, and explaining how state and local prosecutors began to
use criminal child abuse laws to punish prenatal drug use by mothers, although not by
fathers).
26 Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214 (Ct. App. 1977).
27 Id. at 219.
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In 1989, Jennifer Clarise Johnson was prosecuted under Florida law
and convicted for delivering a controlled substance to minor children.28
Johnson had used cocaine late in each of her pregnancies, and her
conviction was upheld by the state district court on the theory that cocaine
had passed from her system to her infant children after their birth but before
the cutting of their umbilical cords.29  The Florida Supreme Court
subsequently overturned Johnson's conviction, holding that the Florida
statute prohibiting delivery of controlled substances did not encompass
delivery in this manner.
30
The first case in which a woman was charged with child abuse on the
theory that her use of drugs or alcohol during pregnancy constituted abuse
of her fetus arose in 1990. Twenty-nine-year-old Diane Pfannenstiel, who
was pregnant and the victim of spousal abuse, sought help from a Wyoming
organization offering aid to battered women. 31 She went to the hospital for
treatment, where testing revealed the presence of alcohol in her system.
32
Pfannenstiel was then arrested and charged under a Wyoming statute
prohibiting child abuse, defined as "the intentional or reckless infliction of
injury on a child., 33 This case represented "the first time that a woman was
charged with child abuse, rather than fetal abuse, before there was a live
child, and for engaging in an entirely legal activity., 34 A state trial judge
dismissed the charges after a lengthy preliminary hearing, because the
prosecution could not prove that the fetus had in fact suffered any injury.3 5
Mirroring the Pfannenstiel case, a recent prosecution of a woman in
Alabama occurred when seven-months-pregnant Demetria Jones sought
36
medical assistance at a Tennessee hospital, complaining of chest pains.
After tests revealed the presence of cocaine in her blood stream, she was
arrested and taken to the county jail.37 Jones was charged with "reckless
endangerment with a deadly weapon," on the grounds that her cocaine
28 Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 602 So. 2d 1288
(Fla. 1992).
29 Id. at 420.
30 Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1296.
31 Ellen Goodman, Being Pregnant, Addicted: It's a Crime, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 11, 1990, at
C12.
32 Id.
33 Renee I. Solomon, Note, Future Fear: Prenatal Duties Imposed by Private Parties, 17
AM. J.L. & MED. 411, 416 (1991) (citation omitted).
34 Id.
35 Id. Pfannenstiel later gave birth to a healthy baby boy. See Woman Who Faced
Charges Has Baby, CHI. TRw., June 17, 1990, at C22.





abuse constituted use of a deadly weapon against her fetus. 38 Her infant
was later born healthy and "tested negative for cocaine., 39 Commentators
at the time argued that the prosecution sent "the message to pregnant
women: Don't seek emergency medical care., 4 0 The same could be said of
Diane Pfannenstiel's case, almost twenty years previously.
As discussed below, state courts have generally held that prosecutions
of pregnant women for criminal child abuse or endangerment (with a deadly
weapon or otherwise) are impermissible. a Prosecutions based on state drug
delivery statutes have also failed. For instance, the Nevada State Supreme
Court held that the state child endangerment statute did not allow criminal
charges to be brought for the transmission of illegal substances from mother
to newborn child through the umbilical cord. 2 The Georgia Court of
Appeals has ruled that transmission of drugs through the umbilical cord
does not allow prosecution under drug transmission statutes, as such
statutes require that the drugs be passed between two or more persons
outside of their bodies.43
The weight of legal authority, therefore, supports the argument that
prosecutions of pregnant women under state child abuse or endangennent
statutes are impermissible. One notable exception to this general rule is a
1997 South Carolina Supreme Court case in which the court held that the
state criminal child neglect statute would allow the prosecution of the
mother of a newborn infant for injuries to her child resulting from her
prenatal substance abuse. 4 This case is discussed at length in Part IV.B.
B. A CASE STUDY OF A SUCCESSFUL CHALLENGE
The 2006 New Mexico case of State v. Martinez4 5 effectively
illustrates many of the legislative and policy concerns that lead courts to
prohibit the prosecutions of pregnant women under state child abuse or
endangerment statutes. Moreover, it exemplifies the kind of successful
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
41 See infra Part IV; see, e.g., Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733, 735 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1995) (noting a previous holding that the statutory definition of "child" as "an
individual who is under eighteen years of age" did not extend to coverage of fetuses); State
v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a state child abuse
statute did not include harm to fetuses resulting from prenatal substance abuse).
42 Sheriff v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596, 599 (Nev. 1994).
43 State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
44 Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778 (S.C. 1997).
41 137 P.3d 1195 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
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challenge to prosecutions of pregnant addicts that this Comment is designed
to facilitate.
In Martinez, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico held that the state's
child abuse law did not authorize a criminal child abuse prosecution of a
woman who had used cocaine during her pregnancy.46 Martinez had
delivered an infant daughter whose blood tested positive for high levels of
cocaine.47 Two months later she admitted to a police detective that she had
ingested crack cocaine two days before her daughter's birth.48 As a result,
Martinez was charged with felony child abuse under the state statute that
prohibited "knowingly, intentionally or negligently, and without justifiable
cause, causing or permitting... [a c]hild to be... placed in a situation that
may endanger... [a c]hild's life or health. 49
The appellate court decided the question of "whether the Legislature
intended a viable fetus to be considered a human being in the context of the
child abuse statute., 50 In the course of finding that the state legislature had
not so intended, the court cited its own prior holding that a fetus was not a
human being for purposes of the state vehicular homicide law.51 The court
observed that subsequent to its decision in the vehicular homicide case, the
legislature had been specific when it wished to include fetuses within the
class of victims covered by a criminal statute. 52 The court also noted that it
could not include fetuses within the statutory definition of "human being"
in the absence of specific legislative intent to do so because the
establishment of crimes and penalties was exclusively a legislative
function.53 A judicial decision criminalizing prenatal child abuse, the court
explained, would violate Martinez's constitutional due process rights, as she
did not have prior warning and fair notice that her conduct was criminal
under the statute.54
A group of health care providers, child and social welfare advocates,
and other entities filed an amicus curiae brief in the Martinez case that uses
many of the most effective arguments against criminal prosecutions of
pregnant drug addicts.55 The brief argues that the criminal prosecution of
46 Id. at 1195.
47 id.
48 Id. at 1196.
49 Id. (citing N.M. STAT. § 30-6-1(D)(1)).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 1197.
53 Id.
54 Id. For further discussion of the fair notice problem, see infra Part V.A.
55 Brief of Pegasus Legal Services for Children et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, State v. Martinez, 161 P.3d 260 (N.M. 2007) (No. 29,775), available at
20091
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Martinez not only contradicted existing state law and policy, but also posed
a serious public health threat that would negatively impact pregnant
addicted women in the future. 56 While the brief focused largely on the
medical, public health, and familial implications of prosecuting and
punishing pregnant drug addicts,57 it also observed that "the extension of
child abuse statutes to include maternal conduct that may endanger a fetus
leads to absurd, unintended, and dangerous results.,58  Advocates for
pregnant women have strong arguments not only that these prosecutions are
"absurd," but that they are also unwise, impermissible, and unconstitutional.
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND RATIONALES: ARGUMENTS FOR AND
AGAINST ALLOWING CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS OF PREGNANT WOMEN
WHO USE DRUGS OR ALCOHOL
Before turning to the legislative and constitutional barriers to
prosecutions of pregnant women, an advocate seeking to challenge such a
prosecution should respond to the policy rationales offered by those
advancing the particular prosecution. There are three main rationales
generally presented in favor of these prosecutions. The first is that criminal
prosecutions will have a deterrent effect: namely, that prosecuted women
will refrain from drug use during potential future pregnancies and will serve
as examples to their peers.59 A South Dakota judge emphasized the
prosecution-as-example motivation, stating that he "sought to 'send a strong
message' to other pregnant addicts., 60  The second rationale is one of
retribution, arguing that pregnant women who use drugs should be
prosecuted not because it helps them or their children, but because they are
deserving of punishment. 6' Finally, proponents argue that these criminal
http://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/NMvMartinezAmicusBrief.pdf [hereinafter Brief of
Pegasus Legal Services]. The brief was submitted after the New Mexico Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the case, State v. Martinez, 141 P.3d 1280 (N.M. 2006), but before the
court subsequently quashed its writ of certiorari, Martinez, 161 P.3d 260.
56 Brief of Pegasus Legal Services, supra note 55, at 3.
" See id. at 7-26.
58 Id. at 27.
59 See Lisa M. Noller, Comment, Taking Care of Two: Criminalizing the Ingestion of
Controlled Substances During Pregnancy, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 367 (1995).
60 Lisa Eckenwiler, Why Not Retribution? The Particularized Imagination and Justice
for Pregnant Addicts, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89, 90 (2004) (citing State v. Christenson, No.
CR1 (S.D. Circuit Ct. Mar. 12, 1990)).
61 See Eckenwiler, supra note 60. For a compelling argument that pregnant women who
use drugs are deemed worthy of punishment because they have failed to conform to societal
norms of motherhood, see Richer, supra note 13, at 1141-43.
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prosecutions will improve matemal and fetal health outcomes as a result of
greater prenatal medical care and monitoring.
62
The prosecution-as-deterrence argument is fairly straightforward. As
with any deterrence rationale, the belief is that if pregnant women thought
that their use of illegal drugs would lead to imprisonment, they would cease
such use. 63 Ironically, those who advance this argument also note both that
"addiction is a disease that is difficult to cure" 64 and that there are few to no
drug rehabilitation programs willing to work with pregnant women.
65
Jennifer Johnson, the Florida woman discussed above who was prosecuted
for delivering cocaine to her newborn through the umbilical cord, sought
treatment during her pregnancy but was unable to find a substance abuse
program that would accept her.66
In fact, there is sometimes a direct link between a woman's inability to
access appropriate drug rehabilitation services and her subsequent
prosecution. One young woman enrolled in a methadone-based heroin
recovery program, and as a result gave birth to a drug-addicted newborn.
67
This story provides insight into further ramifications of the lack of
appropriate drug-rehabilitation services for pregnant women, and makes the
simple deterrence argument for prosecution seem even more difficult to
achieve.
Additionally, experience has shown that women who face this
dilemma often choose to end their pregnancies, rather than to end their
addictions. 68 At least one state court has recognized that prosecutions of
62 See April L. Cherry, The Detention, Confinement, and Incarceration of Pregnant
Women for the Benefit of Fetal Health, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 147, 154 (2007). This
argument has also appeared in appellate briefs submitted on behalf of prosecuting States.
See Brief for the National Association of Counsel for Children as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 4-5, State ex rel. M.W. v. Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729 (Wis. 1997) (No. 95-
2480-W), available at 1996 WL 33476203.
63 Noller, supra note 59, at 369.
64 Id. at 384.
65 Id. at 372-73. For an example of a successful program specifically tailored to the
needs of pregnant drug addicts, see Laura Novak, Forging Ahead with Life's Tests, One Day
at a Time, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2007, at H12.
66 Id. at 132 (internal citation omitted).
67 See Page McGuire Linden, Drug Addiction During Pregnancy: A Call for Increased
Social Responsibility, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 105, 116-17 (1995).
68 See Roberts, supra note 21, at 1446 ("[T]he state's punitive action may coerce women
to have abortions rather than risk being charged with a crime."). It is difficult to find exact
statistics on the magnitude of this unintended consequence of prosecuting pregnant women,
although one study reported that "two-thirds of the women [surveyed] who reported using
cocaine during their pregnancies . . . considered having an abortion." JEANNE FLAVIN, OUR
BODIES, OUR CRIMES: THE POLICING OF WOMEN'S REPRODUCTION IN AMERICA 112 (2009)
(citation omitted). Although federal agencies maintain exhaustive records about women who
have legal abortions, their data do not include any information about reasons why women
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pregnant women for prenatal substance abuse would encourage at-risk
mothers to terminate their pregnancies. 69 For this reason, some pro-life
groups have spoken out against these prosecutions. The spokeswoman for
Texas Right to Life, a major anti-abortion lobby, stated that "telling [a
pregnant addict], 'By the way, you might be charged with criminal
penalties,' would make it likely that she could abort the child., 70  Even
some authors who support fetal abuse prosecutions have observed that the
possibility of discovery and criminal punishment may encourage addicted
women to seek abortions.7 '
A second rationale for prosecuting addicted pregnant women does not
pretend to be interested in the health of these women or of the fetuses they
carry, but appeals to a simpler and starker notion of criminal justice:
retribution. Retribution is a theory of criminal justice and punishment
based on the belief that those who intentionally commit morally or legally
wrongful acts should be held responsible.7  As a Florida judge stated upon
convicting one pregnant drug user: "'The choice to use or not to use cocaine
is just that-a choice'.. . . 'Once the defendant made that choice she
assumed responsibility for the . . . consequences .... , In the trial of
Malissa Ann Crawley, a South Carolina woman who was sentenced to five
years in prison for smoking cocaine during her pregnancy, the judge put the
matter even more bluntly: "I'm sick and tired of these girls having these
choose abortion, and there are no studies on the motivations of women who are forced to
seek illegal abortions. See, e.g., Lilo T. Strauss et al., CDC, Abortion Surveillance-United
States, 2004, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP., Nov. 23, 2007, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5609al.htm. There are, however, many
anecdotal examples of women forced to choose between facing criminal prosecution and
ending their pregnancies. See, e.g., To Stop Abortion by Addict, Her Brother Steps in, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 1992, at Sec. 1, pg. 24.
69 State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140, 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
70 Lomi Kriel, AG Says Docs Needn't Report Moms' Drug Use; Prosecutor Was Using
Law to Go After Pregnant Women, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEwS, Jan. 7, 2005, at 5B.
71 Denison, supra note 6, at 1130.
72 Eckenwiler, supra note 60, at 90. Feminist scholars have argued that the moral
violation for which pregnant addicts are punished is not their drug abuse or any resultant
harm to the fetus, but rather their deviation from "the norm of the ideal mother, especially
when they commit 'unfeminine crimes."' Richer, supra note 13, at 1142 (internal citations
omitted); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, 95 MiCH. L. REV.
938, 951 (1997) (arguing that prosecutions predominately targeting black pregnant women
stem from a widely held "image of the undeserving [b]lack mother").
73 Mark Curriden, Holding Mom Accountable, 76 A.B.A. J., March 1990, at 50, 51
(quoting Florida Circuit Judge O.H. Heaton, Jr.). The judge in this case was acting upon a
sentencing recommendation from a state prosecutor who stated that he wanted to send the




bastard babies on crack cocaine and. . . the law they gave me, it said I
could put them in jail."74
Just as the deterrence rationale ignores the possibility that women may
choose to end their pregnancies rather than work to overcome their drug
addictions, the retribution rationale ignores the wide array of social and
cultural forces that lead to drug use and make it difficult for even the most
well-intentioned pregnant women to cease their use of illegal drugs during
their pregnancies. 75 Although a number of pilot programs focusing on early
intervention, group counseling, and long-term follow-up have been
successful, these programs are neither widely available nor well-funded.76
In addition, the selection of pregnant women as the particular targets
of these retributive desires raises significant constitutional concerns, as
some judges are motivated to punish pregnant drug users more harshly than
other drug defendants.77 This disparity raises concerns of equal protection
violations as in any case where "judicial application of punitive measures is
uneven" in a potentially gender-biased way.78  Another equal protection
74 Bob Herbert, In America; Pregnancy and Addiction, N.Y. TIMEs, June 11, 1998, at
A3 1.
75 In addition to the various well-known psychological factors that make drug addiction
particularly difficult to cure, "[m]any drug treatment programs are not designed with the
needs of women in mind," particularly as relates to the connection between drug abuse and
domestic violence. Linda C. Fentiman, The New "Fetal Protection ": The Wrong Answer to
the Crisis of Inadequate Health Care for Women and Children, 84 DENv. U. L. REv. 537,
592-93 (2006). For an examination of the particularly traumatic nature of crack addiction
for women, see Mindy Thompson Fullilove et al., Clinical Note, Crack 'Hos and Skeezers:
Traumatic Experiences of Women Crack Users, 29 J. SEX RES. 275, 275 (1992) (explaining
that female crack users are particularly susceptible to trauma not only as a result of their drug
use, but also because of the stigma that results "from membership in a despised or oppressed
group").
76 Nat'l Inst. on Drug Abuse, Support Group Improves Outcomes for Pregnant Drug
Users, 14 NIDA NOTES, Nov. 1999, http://www.drugabuse.gov/NIDANotes/NNVoll4N4/
BBoard.html#Support (noting the release of a study finding that "women who participated in
a drug abuse support group had more prenatal care visits than drug-abusing women who did
not attend the support group, and their infants had higher birthweights"); see also Liz Szabo,
Intervention Negates Drug Toll in Pregnancy; Early Intervention Is Key to Healthiness,
USA TODAY, June 26, 2008, at 6D (discussing a successful comprehensive prenatal drug
treatment program implemented at a California hospital). These programs appear to be
funded sporadically by federal and private grants rather than on any consistent national basis.
See, e.g., Don Finley, Grant Aims to Get 180 Moms off Drugs Over Next 5 Years, SAN
ANTONIO NEws-ExPRESS, Oct. 27, 2007, at 4B.
77 Peggy Hora & Barrie Becker, Judicial Considerations When Sentencing Pregnant
Substance Users, 35 JUDGES J., Spring 1996, at 3, 7; see also Linden, supra note 67, at 129-
30 (arguing, in the context of involuntary civil commitments of pregnant women, that "there
is an injustice in a system which forces treatment upon a woman, not because she has
committed a crime, but rather because she has become pregnant").
78 Hora & Becker, supra note 77, at 8.
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issue is raised by those who note that women of color are significantly more
likely to be arrested and tried for drug use during pregnancy than white
women, 79 an arguable violation of equal protection of the laws based on
race that should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
A third rationale for these prosecutions is that monitoring or
imprisoning pregnant women through application of criminal sanctions will
lead to improved maternal or fetal health outcomes. 8' For example,
selective prosecutions of pregnant women of color are often justified in the
guise of public concern over an epidemic of so-called crack babies.82
Studies have shown, however, that cocaine's effects on a fetus "are less
severe than those of alcohol and are comparable to those of tobacco."83
Moreover, public health officials generally discourage these prosecutions,
believing that pregnant women tend to react to the threat of prosecution not
by terminating their drug use, but by avoiding prenatal care.84 As a result of
this concern, an array of leading medical and public health associations,
including the American Medical Association and American Academy of
Pediatrics, have registered their opposition to criminal punishment of
85 TeFoipregnant drug users. The Florida Supreme Court has also noted this issue,arguing that pregnant women who are addicted to drugs may choose not to
79 Roberts, supra note 72, at 938 & nn.3-5 (citing an unpublished report prepared by the
American Civil Liberties Union Reproductive Freedom project and her own interviews with
the attorneys of prosecuted women).
80 See infra Part V.B; see also Kathleen R. Sandy, The Discrimination Inherent in
America's Drug War: Hidden Racism Revealed by Examining the Hysteria over Crack, 54
ALA. L. REv. 665 (2003) (noting that the social costs of the drug war are disproportionately
paid by black Americans and particularly by black mothers).
81 See, e.g., Noller, supra note 59, at 389 (advocating for strictly criminalizing drug use
during pregnancy as the only way "to prevent thousands of babies from being born with
physical and mental defects").
82 See FLAVIN, supra note 68, at 108-15 (discussing selective prosecutions of women,
particularly women of color, for exposing their fetuses to illegal drugs in the absence of clear
evidence linking such exposure to actual harm).
83 Susan Okie, The Epidemic That Wasn't, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, at Dl.
84 James G. Hodge, Jr., Annotation, Prosecution of Mother for Prenatal Substance Abuse
Based on Endangerment of or Delivery of Controlled Substance to Child, 70 A.L.R. 5th 461,
470 (2007). For an excellent analysis of the "incomplete science" linking prenatal drug use
to negative fetal health outcomes, see Michelle D. Mills, Comment, Fetal Abuse
Prosecutions: The Triumph of Reaction over Reason, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 989, 999-1001
(1998). Other scholars have noted the serious correlation versus causation problem present
in many studies that attempt to separate the effects of prenatal drug abuse from other health
and economic factors. See Roberts, supra note 21, at 1429-30 ("The interpretation of studies
of cocaine-exposed infants is often clouded by the presence of other fetal risk factors . ...
[P]regnant addicts often receive little or no prenatal care and may be malnourished."). The
problem implicates issues of access to health care and class disparities in medical treatment
that go far beyond the scope of this Comment.
85 Cherry, supra note 62, at 154.
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seek prenatal care because they are afraid of detection and prosecution,
even though their pregnancies present an extraordinary need for prenatal
and neonatal interventions.86 In one attempt to solve this problem, an
Arkansas county circuit judge placed an unborn fetus in the custody of the
Department of Human Services, and stated in her ruling that:
I can't stop her [the mother] from using drugs, but I can keep her off of them until
she has this child ... by keeping her locked up. And the child is not to leave the
hospital with her .... She's going to have an ultrasound and other prenatal tests, and
I want to know if the baby has any overt signs of malformation. And then I want her
to remain in the jail until she goes into labor, and then she's going to be taken directly
out to the hospital for delivery.
8 7
While having the virtue of blunt efficacy, incarcerating pregnant
women simply to force them to undergo medical treatment violates their
rights of personal liberty and bodily integrity. Pregnant women have been
subjected to incarceration or other criminal sanctions for a variety of
reasons: to prevent them from having access to illegal drugs, to compel
them to carry their pregnancies to term, to force them to submit to a
physician's orders regarding their care, or to allow the courts in other ways
to control and direct a woman's conduct during her pregnancy. 88 Instead of
improving access to comprehensive maternal and child prenatal care and
thus benefiting the fetus and the mother, incarceration of pregnant women
may actually result in serious harm, either by restricting access to prenatal
care or exposing them to less-than-ideal conditions within the prison
itself.89 Incarceration of pregnant women does not help them to overcome
their addictions, nor does it serve to protect their fetuses from drug use, as
illegal drugs are readily available in prison. 90 Although some may argue
that women in prison would have better access to prenatal care than they
could afford or would choose to seek out otherwise, prisons are not
prepared to offer adequate care to pregnant women.
9 1
86 Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1295-96 (Fla. 1992).
87 Bennett v. Collier, 95 S.W.3d 782, 783-84 (Ark. 2003) (alteration in original)
(referring to, but not citing, the opinion of Circuit Judge Collier in the course of overturning
the lower court's ruling for lack of jurisdiction).
88 Cherry, supra note 62, at 148.
89 Id. at 154.
90 See, e.g., Thomas E. Feucht & Andrew Keyser, Reducing Drug Use in Prisons:
Pennsylvania's Approach, NAT'L INST. OF JUST. J., Oct. 1999, at 10, 11 (asserting that
"prison inmates still manage to obtain illicit drugs" and detailing the extreme lengths to
which the Pennsylvania prison system went in order to control drug use in state prisons).
91 Hora & Becker, supra note 77, at 6, 8 (detailing various cases in which pregnant
women have brought suit against prison officials for misconduct resulting in late term
miscarriages, infant deaths, and other harms).
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For these reasons, the stated rationale that prosecuting and confining
pregnant women will protect women and their fetuses can be challenged by
advocates for pregnant women with evidence of the actual effects of such
confinement. Even if pregnant women are not incarcerated, the threat of
criminal prosecution can wreak serious harm on the doctor-patient
relationship, and may encourage pregnant women to refrain from candidly
discussing their drug use with their doctors because they are afraid such
disclosure will result in criminal prosecution.92
Strong policy arguments can have the effect of encouraging appellate
courts to defer to legislative judgments disallowing criminal child abuse
prosecutions of pregnant women.93 As a general procedural note, it is
important that advocates for pregnant women present these policy
arguments at the trial level in order to preserve them for appellate review.
As the Kentucky Supreme Court noted with reference to a public health
argument, the evidence and expert testimony underlying these policy
arguments must be authenticated and rendered admissible at trial in order
for them to enter into the record available for appellate review.
94
IV. STATUTORY ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT: A SURVEY OF STATE
COURT HOLDINGS
While consideration of policy arguments is important for advocates for
pregnant women, the majority of state appellate courts, when confronted
with a prosecution of a pregnant woman under a state child abuse or
endangerment statute, have chosen to treat the analysis as an exercise in
statutory interpretation.95 And in almost every case, that exercise has ended
with the conclusion that the state statute at hand was not intended by the
given state legislature to cover, and cannot be read to cover, prenatal
conduct of a pregnant woman affecting only her fetus. This conclusion is
the only correct one given existing standards and methods of statutory
construction, and a defense argument based on statutory interpretation and
92 Brief of Pegasus Legal Services, supra note 55, at 8.
93 Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733, 737 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that the
complexity of the policy arguments presented weighed heavily in favor of a legislative
determination of which methods would most appropriately address the consequences of
prenatal drug abuse).
94 Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 284-85 (Ky. 1993).
95 See, e.g., Herron v. State, 729 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (writing that in
addressing the question of "whether an unborn child is a dependent ... we turn to the rules
of statutory construction"); State v. Wade, 232 S.W.3d 663, 664 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (noting
that "[s]tatutory interpretation is an issue of law which this court reviews de novo"); State v.
Martinez, 137 P.3d 1195, 1196 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that "[r]esolution of this




legislative intent should prove successful if grounded in the particular
language and legislative history of the statute at hand.
In conducting this analysis, courts focus on the guiding principle that it
is the role of the legislature, rather than the judiciary, to define the limits of
criminal behavior.96  Courts often note that the decision not to enact
particular statutes criminalizing prenatal conduct reflects a considered
policy decision on the part of the legislature, one which they are reluctant to
question.97 Legislative intent can be analyzed positively on the basis of
affirmative acts of the legislature in response to existing or proposed child
abuse statutes. It can also be analyzed negatively; in at least one instance
when a court had previously ruled on the construction of a state child abuse
statute, legislative inaction after that holding was found to constitute an
endorsement of the court's decision. 98
A. APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Advocates for pregnant women facing criminal charges stemming
from their use of illegal drugs during pregnancy can make statutory
interpretation arguments based on the text of the given statute at issue.
These include a textual argument that a fetus is not a "child" as defined in
the state child abuse statute, a contextual argument based on the entirety of
a given state's code, a legal argument related to the established rule of
lenity, and a constitutional argument based on women's rights to bodily
autonomy. This Part provides an overview of these arguments and an
analysis of their efficacy.
Any exercise in statutory application begins with a close analysis of
the statute itself.99  In the prosecutions at issue here, the state statutes
applied are usually expressly aimed at targeting the problem of child abuse.
These laws allow the prosecutions of those who recklessly endanger or
abuse children. To provide a specific example, the Illinois Code makes it
unlawful "for any person to willfully cause or permit the life or health of a
96 See, e.g., Martinez, 137 P.3d at 1197 ("[T]he power to define crimes and to establish
criminal penalties is exclusively a legislative function.").
97 See, e.g., Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306, 311 (Md. 2006).
98 State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 175 (S.C. 2003) (arguing that as the South
Carolina Supreme Court had previously held "child" to include "fetus" and the legislature
had not acted to overturn that result, applying the same interpretation subsequently was in
line with legislative intent). The McKnight decision will be discussed at greater length in
Part V.B, infra.
99 As Justice Rehnquist once wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court: "We begin with the
familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the
language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary,
that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n.
v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
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child under the age of 18 to be endangered or to willfully cause or permit a
child to be placed in circumstances that endanger the child's life or
health." 00
Because state child abuse statutes are designed to protect children, not
other potential victims of abuse, interpretation of these statutes should begin
with analysis of the scope of the protected class-what is meant by child
abuse? Whether applying the Illinois Code or the Code of any other state,
pregnant women can argue that the plain meaning of the word child cannot
logically be stretched to cover acts affecting a fetus. 10 1 Courts have noted
that the usual meaning of the word child does not include application prior
to an infant's birth, observing that common usage of the terms parent and
child generally means that pregnant women do not become parents prior to
the birth of their children, and that fetuses do not become children prior to
birth." 2
Another commonly used technique is for courts to examine the use of
the word child in other sections of a given state's code, as in this example
from an opinion of the Oklahoma Supreme Court:
Section 7001-1.3 contains definitions for "Child in need of mental health
treatment," § 7001-1.3(5); "Child with a disability," § 7001-1.3(6); "Child-placing
agency," § 7001-1.3(7). The legislature's choice to define and include these phrases
within the ambit of the Oklahoma Children's Code makes it abundantly clear that it
intended the Code to apply to those human beings who have been born and who are
under the age of eighteen. No fetus could be in need of mental health treatment, and
no fetus could be placed through child placement services. These terms apply only to
those who are born, living outside the womb of the mother. 1
03
100 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-21.6 (West 2002) (emphasis added). Illinois law
does specifically address the exposure of newborns to illegal substances in another provision
of the code, stating that "a newborn infant whose blood, urine, or meconium contains any
amount of a controlled substance as defined in subsection (f) of Section 102 of the Illinois
Controlled Substances Act or a metabolite thereof' is a neglected child for the purposes of
civil actions to terminate parental rights. 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3 (LexisNexis 2007
& Supp. 2008).
101 See, e.g., People ex rel. H., 74 P.3d 494, 495 (Colo. App. 2003) (finding that the
Colorado Children's Code intended child to mean a person from birth to age eighteen); see
also Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733, 735 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) ("Applying the
ordinary meaning of these words leads us to conclude that the statute refers to conduct that
directly endangers a child, not to activity that affects a fetus and thereby harms the resulting
child.").
102 State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 711 (Ohio 1992) (holding that a mother could not be
prosecuted under the state statute for substance abuse occurring before the birth of the child).
103 Starks v. State, 18 P.3d 342, 346 (Okla. 2001) (holding that the trial court had
committed reversible error when it found that "the Oklahoma Children's Code provided an
avenue for it to take temporary emergency custody of appellant's fetus"); see also H., 74
P.3d 494 (finding that the Colorado Code contained various references indicating that a
"child" was a person from birth to age eighteen).
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This technique is known as the whole act rule, a canon of statutory
construction stating that individual provisions are to be interpreted in light
of the language and objectives of the entire statute. 0 4 This rule generally
means that courts will not confine their analysis to the particular line of
legislation at issue, but will consider the entire statute as well as the
underlying purposes and policies of the law."0 5
As noted throughout this Comment, however, there are outlier cases
that provide counterweights to the prevailing conclusion that child abuse
statutes do not cover conduct occurring before a child's birth. In 1998, the
Family Court in New York's Suffolk County found that the Family Court
Act could be extended to protect a fetus from acts of a pregnant woman
which could cause damage to the child at or after its birth.10 6 The court in
that case considered the question of whether a fetus was a legal
"personality" such that the court could enter a finding of "derivative
neglect" of the fetus on the grounds that "evidence of abuse or neglect of
one child indicates a fundamental defect in the parent's understanding of
the duties of parenthood.' 1 7 The court reasoned that the entirety of the
Family Court Act must be read as a whole, and that various sections of the
Act, particularly those related to paternity petitions and property rights,
indicated a legislative intent and purpose to protect fetal interests.' 0 8 As a
result, the court found that the pregnant woman could be found liable for
neglect of her fetus. 10 9 The court's analysis is problematic in several
respects, and the case has little precedential value; to date, it has been
referenced by only one other court, which presented it as a singular
counterexample to a widely supported rule." 0
In another case contrary to the weight of legal authority on the subject,
the Ohio Supreme Court held, in a proceeding under that state's civil abuse
statute, that a newborn child whose blood tests positive for the presence of
illegal drugs is per se an abused child."' The court based its decision on
104 Described by Black's Law Dictionary as the "whole-statute rule," this is a "principle
of statutory construction that a statute should be considered in its entirety, and that the words
used within it should be given their ordinary meanings unless there is a clear indication to
the contrary." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1628 (8th ed. 2004).
105 Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) (internal citations omitted).
106 In re Unborn Child, 683 N.Y.S.2d 366, 368 (Fam. Ct. 1998) (addressing the State's
petition of derivative neglect of a fetus when the pregnant woman had admitted to using
drugs during her pregnancy, had previously given birth to a cocaine-positive infant, and, on
grounds of child neglect, had her parental rights to her first four children terminated).
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 371-72.
110 People ex rel. H., 74 P.3d 494, 497 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
111 In re Baby Boy Blackshear, 736 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ohio 2000).
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the assertion that the question was not whether the fetus was a child within
the meaning of the statute, but whether the relevant code section applied to
a newborn child born with drugs in his system as the result of maternal drug
use during gestation.' 12 This is a rather oblique way of addressing the issue,
seemingly intended to allow the court to avoid the truly critical question of
whether a fetus is a child that can be covered by a state child abuse statute
(as noted in the concurring opinion).1 13
As in the above Ohio case, pregnant women around the country
sometimes face civil, rather than criminal, actions resulting from their use
of illegal drugs during pregnancy, such as actions to remove children from
their parents' custody and to terminate parental rights. 114 However, this
Comment is intended primarily to strengthen defenses to criminal
prosecutions. In this context, a canon of statutory interpretation applicable
to criminal law, known as the rule of lenity, must also be considered.
1 5
The rule of lenity generally requires that when a criminal statute is
ambiguous, courts must resolve the ambiguity in favor of the criminal
defendant.'1 16 In cases where the text and context of the code provision may
not clearly prove or disprove the applicability of a child abuse statute to a
woman's prenatal conduct, the rule of lenity should apply, as expressed by
the Supreme Court's dicta in United States v. Granderson: "[W]here text,
structure, and history fail to establish that the Government's position is
unambiguously correct-we apply the rule of lenity and resolve the
ambiguity in [the defendant's] favor.'17
Because there is significant legal debate concerning the permissibility
and constitutionality of prosecutions of pregnant women who use drugs (at
least absent legislative clarity), and because this area is replete with
ambiguities, the rule of lenity militates against allowing these prosecutions.
112 Id. at 464.
113 Id. at 465 (Resnick, J., concurring).
114 See, e.g., Bennett v. Collier, 95 S.W.3d 782 (Ark. 2003) (relating to an order
terminating the parental rights of a pregnant woman who was using drugs even before the
birth of the child); H., 74 P.3d 494 (involving civil dependency and neglect proceedings
brought as a result of a pregnant woman's methamphetamine use); State ex rel. M.W. v.
Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729 (Wis. 1997) (involving a civil action to take a fetus into
protective custody).
115 This is an old and well-established rule. See, e.g., Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S.
808, 812 (1971) ("[Almbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved
in favor of lenity." (citation omitted)).
116 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 104, at 1359.
117 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994).
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Courts in two recent cases have applied the rule of lenity in deciding that
state statutes could not be extended to encompass prenatal conduct.' 
1 8
In 2005, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that a mother could not be
charged for manslaughter when her infant son died two days after his birth
as a result of her prenatal ingestion of crystal methamphetamine." 9 The
court noted that since there was neither clear statutory language nor any
clear expression of legislative intent, they were required to apply the rule of
lenity and that as a result, the state statute had to be construed in favor of
the defendant. 
120
In State v. Martinez, discussed in detail above, the Court of Appeals of
New Mexico found that cocaine use during pregnancy could not form the
basis for a felony child abuse charge. 121 The Martinez court explained that
as a rule of statutory interpretation "penal statutes must be strictly
construed, and any doubts about their construction must be resolved in
favor of lenity.' 22 Courts are also careful to avoid judicially expanding a
criminal statute beyond the scope of that which was intended by the
legislature. 123 The courts' analysis of the rule of lenity is closely tied to
their concerns about constitutional requirements of fair notice, an issue
analyzed at greater length in Part V.A.
A final relevant rule of statutory interpretation is the admonition that
courts must avoid interpreting statutes in ways that would create
constitutional conflicts, if other interpretations are available. In NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, the Supreme Court made it clear that an act of
Congress should not be construed to violate the Constitution if any other
possible construction is possible. 24 State courts should do the same with
state statutes and avoid interpreting the textual meanings of state criminal
laws in ways that may create conflicts with federal or state constitutional
rights.
Given that the Supreme Court has recognized a woman's right to
bodily autonomy and to control over her own reproductive decisions,
125
118 State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210, 1225 (Haw. 2005); State v. Martinez, 137 P.3d 1195
(N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
119 Aiwohi, 123 P.3d at 1225.
120 Id. at 1224.
121 Martinez, 137 P.3d at 1195.
122 Id. at 1197 (quoting State v. Leiding, 812 P.2d 797, 799 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991)).
123 See, e.g., Herron v. State, 729 N.E.2d 1008, 1011 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that
an unborn child is not a dependent under Indiana law, and that therefore a pregnant woman
cannot be charged with neglect of a dependent child).
124 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979).
125 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, the Court held that there is a
constitutionally-based right to privacy "broad enough to cover the abortion decision." Id. at
155. The Court has subsequently noted that decisions regarding reproductive rights are those
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criminal prosecutions of pregnant women for acts which harm their fetuses
but no one else veer dangerously close to infringing upon constitutionally
protected privacy and procreative rights. State legislatures cannot be
presumed to enter purposefully into such shaky constitutional terrain absent
evidence of specific intent to do so.' 26 While many women have asserted a
constitutional conflict when challenging their prosecutions for prenatal drug
use, courts generally decline to reach the constitutional question, instead
deciding the cases on statutory interpretation, legislative intent, or other less
fundamental grounds.
1 27
A successful statutory interpretation challenge, therefore, should rely
upon these four main arguments: the word child or person in the statute at
issue is not intended to encompass conduct with reference to fetuses; the
whole act of the given state's children's or family code indicates a
legislative understanding and intent of child as meaning a minor from birth
onwards; the rule of lenity militates against reading a criminal child abuse
or endangerment statute in a way that would punish a woman for conduct
during pregnancy; and a punitive reading would conflict with a woman's
constitutional rights of privacy and reproductive autonomy.
B. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Courts confronting prosecutions of pregnant women, after considering
the text of the statute at issue, have also analyzed the intentions of the state
legislatures as expressed during the enactment process of the state's child
abuse or endangerment statutes.128 The majority of courts that have
"matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, [that] are central to the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment." Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992).
126 See, e.g., N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Serv. v. LV., 889 A.2d 1153, 1158 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2005) (holding that a woman who had refused to take certain HIV
medications during her pregnancy had not committed child abuse because, inter alia, the
relevant statute "does not and cannot be construed to permit government interference with a
woman's protected right to control her body and her future during her pregnancy").
127 See, e.g., Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733, 738 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)
("Petitioner also argues that charging her with violating section 13-3623 violates her right to
privacy under the Arizona and Federal Constitutions. Given our conclusion that Arizona's
child abuse statute does not reach petitioner's conduct, we decline to reach that constitutional
issue.").
128 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 283 (Ky. 1993) (addressing the
question of whether "the General Assembly intend[ed] to include prenatal injury from a
pregnant woman's self-abuse as well as injury inflicted by a third person" as the
"dispositive" issue in the case); State v. Wade, 232 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007)
(finding a clear "indication of the legislature's intent to avoid the criminal prosecution of
mothers whose addictive behaviors may indirectly harm their unborn children"); State v.
Martinez, 137 P.3d 1195, 1196 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (stating that "this Court must
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performed this analysis have concluded that legislative intent underlying
state child abuse or endangerment statutes does not allow prosecutions of
pregnant women for acts or omissions with reference to the fetuses they
carry. 129
One such case was an appeal from a criminal child abuse prosecution
in Kentucky. 130  In Welch, the Supreme Court of Kentucky vacated a
conviction entered against a woman whose newborn had suffered severe
drug withdrawal symptoms shortly after birth. The court held, on the basis
of its legislative intent analysis, that the legislature had not intended to
impose additional criminal penalties upon the use of drugs during
pregnancy, but rather intended to subject pregnant drug users to the same
criminal penalties as all other drug users.
131
In a Maryland case, Regina Kilmon was charged with creating a
substantial risk of harm to her child by using cocaine during pregnancy,
132
and was found guilty of reckless endangerment under Maryland law. 33 On
appeal, her case was combined in the Maryland Court of Appeals with that
of Kelly Lynn Cruz, which contained similar facts and a similar reckless
endangerment charge.1 34 The appellate court reversed the two convictions,
explaining that the answer to the question presented-"whether the
intentional ingestion of cocaine by a pregnant woman can form the basis for
a conviction ... [for] the reckless endangerment of the later-born child"-
was no.
135
The court noted that because the crime charged was purely one of
statutory creation, the issue before it was a matter of statutory
determine whether the Legislature intended a viable fetus to be considered a human being in
the context of the child abuse statute"); State v. Dunn, 916 P.2d 952, 955 (Wash. Ct. App.
1996) (explaining that "[w]hen the Legislature intends to include the fetus in a class of
criminal victims, it specifically writes that language into the statute").
129 See, e.g., Welch, 864 S.W.2d at 280; Wade, 232 S.W.3d at 666; Martinez, 137 P.3d at
1198; Dunn, 916 P.2d 952 at 955.
130 Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280.
'' Id. at 284.
132 Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306, 307 (Md. 2005).
133 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-204(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2008).
134 Kilmon, 905 A.2d at 308. Cruz had given birth at twenty-nine weeks of pregnancy to
a baby boy, and drug tests had revealed the presence of cocaine in his system and in her own.
Stephanie Desmon, Cocaine Baby Cases Reversed; Md. High Court Rejects Reckless
Endangerment Convictions for Drug Use by Pregnant Women, BALT. SUN, Aug. 4, 2006, at
IA.
135 Kilmon, 905 A.2d at 307. For a comprehensive overview of the Kilmon case, see
Jason Weintraub, Recent Development, Kilmon v. State: A Pregnant Woman's Intentional
Ingestion of Cocaine Cannot Form the Basis for a Conviction Under Section 3-204(A)(1) of
the Criminal Law Article for the Reckless Endangerment of Her Later-Born Child, 37 U.
BALT. L.F. 64 (2006).
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construction. 136 As a result, the inquiry before the court was to ascertain
whether the Maryland General Assembly had intended to criminalize the
conduct of the two pregnant defendants.1 37 The Maryland statute at issue
states that it is a misdemeanor for a person to recklessly "engage in conduct
that creates a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to
another."1
38
Aware of the constitutional issues that would arise from a charge
predicated upon fetal personhood, the State in the Kilmon case argued that
Kilmon was prosecuted not for harm to her fetus, but because her use of
cocaine during pregnancy constituted reckless endangerment of her child at
or after his birth. 139 The State's argument was generally based on prior
common law and statutory rulings that "an injury committed while a child
is still in utero can produce criminal liability if the child is later born
alive, 140 and upon a legislative intent-based argument that the legislature
had implicitly adopted the "born alive" rule into the state's reckless child
endangerment statute. 14' The appellants responded that the common law
"born alive" rule applied only to homicides committed by actors other than
the pregnant woman, and did not reflect any legislative determination with
reference to the acts of the pregnant woman herself.
142
The Maryland Court of Appeals noted that there was no evidence of
direct legislative intent that would settle the dispute, 143 and stated that in the
absence of such specific indicia, it would follow a general requirement that
courts are not permitted to construe a statute in a way that produces
"farfetched, absurd, or illogical results which would not likely have been
intended by the enacting body.' 44 The court was particularly concerned
that a reading of the reckless endangerment statute which encompassed acts
of a pregnant woman harming only her fetus would allow the statute to be
interpreted not only to prohibit drug use during pregnancy, but to
criminalize a huge range of potentially harmful acts of pregnant women.
145
136 Kilmon, 905 A.2d at 308.
137 Id.
138 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-204(a)(1).
139 Kilmon, 905 A.2d at 308-09 (Md. 2006) (referring to, but not citing, the State's briefs
for the prosecution).
140 Id. at 310.
141 Id. at 311.
142 Id. In fact, it appears that the born-alive rule would have specifically excluded acts of
the mother during pregnancy, as it required "a showing that an infant was completely
expelled from the mother's womb and possessed a separate and independent existence from
the mother." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 104, at 196.





This "slippery slope" argument has been of great concern to the courts in
several other cases as well.
146
Having found no clear indication that the legislature had intended to
include prenatal acts of a pregnant woman within the aegis of the reckless
endangerment statute, the court in Kilmon then considered the many
instances in which the lawmakers of Maryland had chosen not to enact bills
specifically criminalizing similar acts. 147 The court noted that a number of
bills seeking to expand the definition of criminal child abuse to include
drug use by pregnant women had failed in the face of opposition from state
agencies and public interest groups. 48 The court explained that an analysis
of the legislative history made it clear that the General Assembly rejected
the bills not because drug use during pregnancy was already criminal under
the reckless endangerment law, but because criminalizing it would not be a
wise public health or policy decision. 149  Even when enacting a code
provision specifically governing the murder or manslaughter of viable
fetuses, the legislature specifically included language exempting the acts or
omissions of pregnant women with regard to their own fetuses. 150 Clauses
contained within fetal homicide laws exempting the acts of the mother are
quite common and represent a sound public policy protecting pregnant
women from extreme judicial scrutiny. 15
The Maryland Court of Appeals then noted that the General
Assembly's decision to avoid imposing criminal penalties on pregnant
women for the effects that their drug use might have on their children after
birth reflected a policy judgment, not simply a lack of opportunity to
address the issue. 52 As a result, the court held that the legislature had not
146 See, e.g., Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733, 736 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) ("Were
we to extend the statute to prenatal conduct that affects a fetus in a manner apparent after
birth.., the boundaries of proscribed conduct would become impermissibly broad and ill-
defined."); State v. Wade, 232 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) ("[T]he logic of
allowing such prosecutions would be extended to cases involving smoking, alcohol
ingestion, the failure to wear seatbelts, and any other conduct that might cause harm to a
mother's unborn child."); State v. J.Z., 596 N.W.2d 490, 494 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) ("Under
such a construction, a woman could risk criminal charges for any perceived self-destructive
behavior during her pregnancy that may result in injuries to her unborn child.").
147 905 A.2d at 312-13 (discussing a number of bills introduced into and rejected by the
Maryland General Assembly during the two decades prior to the case at bar that would have
either criminalized drug use during pregnancy or rendered it subject to civil sanctions).
149 Id. at 312 (noting that the Department of Human Services had opposed, on public
policy grounds, two bills that eventually died in the House Judiciary Committee).
149 id.
150 Id. at 313 (citing MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-103(f)).
151 See Carolyn B. Ramsey, Restructuring the Debate over Fetal Homicide Laws, 67
OHIO ST. L.J. 721, 734-37 (2006).
152 Kilmon, 905 A.2d at 314.
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intended for the reckless child endangerment statute to apply to drug use by
a pregnant woman.153 The Kilmon case thus provides an excellent example
of the kind of careful analysis of legislative intent that may enable a
successful challenge to a prosecution of a pregnant woman.
The foregoing courts have determined that state legislators and others
responsible for the enactment of laws did not intend that laws governing
child abuse be expanded to criminalize the acts of women prior to giving
birth. There are, however, a few cases to the contrary. In 1997 the
Supreme Court of South Carolina held, on the basis of a legislative intent
analysis, that the state's child abuse statute did allow prosecutions of
pregnant women.154 The court held that the state legislature had intended to
include viable fetuses within the protection of the state Children's Code,
and dismissed the petitioner's fair notice and right-to-privacy constitutional
arguments. 1
55
The South Carolina case, the only one thus far in which a state
supreme court has allowed the criminal prosecution of a pregnant woman
for child abuse or endangerment, arose when Cornelia Whitner was found
guilty of criminal child neglect after her child was bom with cocaine in its
system as a result of her drug use during pregnancy. 156 Social workers took
Whitner's child from the hospital maternity ward, without notifying her in
person, when he was three days old. 157 The local judge assigned to the case
asked Whitner if her son was "a crack baby," then told Whitner's lawyer, "I
think I'll just let her go to jail."' 158
On appeal, the State argued that the relevant South Carolina statute
''encompasses maternal acts endangering or likely to endanger the life,
comfort, or health of a viable fetus."'1 59 The South Carolina Supreme Court
reasoned that the broad scope and "comprehensive remedial purposes" of
the Children's Code allowed them to infer the coverage of viable fetuses
within the Code, even in the absence of specific legislative history so
indicating.1 60 The court held, primarily on the basis of its own precedent,
1 Id. at 315.
154 Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 781 (S.C. 1997).
151 Id. at 784-85.
156 Id. at 778-79.
157 Crack Mom in Prison to Appeal to Supreme Court; Her Lawyers Will Challenge S.
Carolina's Child-Abuse Law, Cm. TRIB., Mar. 19, 1998, at C8 [hereinafter Crack Mom in
Prison]. Whitner's petition for certiorari review was denied by the United States Supreme
Court. Whitner v. South Carolina, 523 U.S. 1145 (1998).
158 Crack Mom in Prison, supra note 157. Whitner had previously faced this judge in
neglect proceedings related to one of her older children, and he had sentenced her to
probation on the condition that she "stay away from drugs and alcohol." Id.
"' Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 779.
160 Id. at 780-81.
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that the plain language of the statute allowed such a reading, stating that it
"would be absurd to recognize the viable fetus as a person for purposes of
homicide laws and wrongful death statutes but not for purposes of statutes
proscribing child abuse.' 61  It dismissed Whitner's argument that the
introduction of several specific bills intended to criminalize prenatal drug
use implied a legislative belief that such conduct was not already
criminal.' 62  In response, the court asserted that the acts of subsequent
legislatures were of no aid in understanding the intent of the legislature that
had enacted the child abuse law.' 63 However, as Associate Justice Moore
wrote in strong dissent, "the repeated failure of the legislature to pass
proposed bills addressing the problem of drug use during pregnancy is
evidence the child abuse and neglect statute is not intended to apply in this
instance" and that by finding otherwise, the majority ignored both the intent
of the South Carolina legislature and the weight of authority from other
courts which had considered the issue. 1
64
The South Carolina case is a disturbing anomaly in the legislative
intent jurisprudence governing prosecutions of addicted pregnant women.
As a general rule, it appears that a legislative-intent challenge to such a
prosecution can be brought if based on two primary factors: the nature of
the state's statutory and common law at the time the applied statute was
enacted, and any subsequent attempts to enact legislation specifically
criminalizing a pregnant woman's drug use under a child abuse or
endangerment rubric (which would imply that such conduct was not
covered under the statute at the time of prosecution).
161 Id. at 780. As the Chief Justice of the court noted in dissent, South Carolina
precedent was not uniform in its definition of "child" as encompassing fetuses: "We have
already indicated that a child within the meaning of § 20-7-90(A)(1985), which criminalizes
non-support, must be one already born." Id. at 787 (Finney, C.J., dissenting). The legal
distinction between statutes authorizing prosecutions for fetal homicides and statutes
governing child abuse is complex and far beyond the scope of this Comment. However,
fetal homicide statutes generally explicitly state that they are intended to govern acts
affecting fetuses, while child abuse statutes do not do so. In addition, fetal homicide statutes
generally include explicit exemptions for acts of pregnant women that result in the deaths of
their fetuses, while child abuse statutes obviously do not exempt parents from acts that harm
their children. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507A.010 (LexisNexis 2008) (establishing
Kentucky's fetal homicide framework, but stating that "[n]othing in this chapter shall apply
to any acts of a pregnant woman that caused the death of her unborn child"). For an
excellent analysis of the debate surrounding fetal homicide laws and their inescapable
conflicts with women's reproductive autonomy, see Ramsey, supra note 151.
162 Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 781.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 787 (Moore, A.J., dissenting). For further consideration of the flaws in the
court's legislative intent analysis, see Tara-Nicholle B. DeLouth, Recent Developments,
Pregnant Drug Addicts as Child Abusers: A South Carolina Ruling, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN'S




A. FAIR NOTICE REQUIREMENTS AS A BAR TO PROSECUTION
One of the most fundamental precepts of criminal law is that the
constitutional right of due process of law is predicated upon the accused
having fair notice that his conduct is proscribed by the applied law. This
proposition was already well established by 1931, when Justice Holmes
explicitly defined fair notice as "fair warning.. . in language that the
common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain
line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should
be clear. 165 The U.S. Supreme Court has more recently written that in
addition to its status as a central aspect of due process, "[t]he fair warning
requirement also reflects the deference due to the legislature, which
possesses the power to define crimes and their punishments."
166
It is important to distinguish the concept of fair notice from the equally
well established precept that ignorance of the law is no excuse for breaking
it. 167 Whereas the main argument in an "ignorance of the law" defense
would be that the criminal defendant did not personally know that his
conduct was forbidden, 168 a fair notice defense argues that the conduct was
not in fact forbidden by the statute, and that "due process bars courts from
applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither
the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within
its scope."'
169
The notice that is lacking when pregnant women are prosecuted for
using drugs is not that women cannot be expected to know illegal use of
controlled substances is a crime,17  which is of course common
165 McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
166 Lanier v. United States, 520 U.S. 259, 265 n.5 (1997).
167 Ignorantia juris non excusat is the principle that "lack of knowledge about a legal
requirement or prohibition is never an excuse to a criminal charge." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 104, at 762.
168 See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (holding that Los
Angeles's felon registration requirements violated due process when applied to an individual
who had no actual knowledge of her duty to register); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612,
617 (1954) ("iNlo man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not
reasonably understand to be proscribed.").
i69 Lanier, 520 U.S. at 266.
170 It is worthwhile, however, to note that "[v]irtually no state... punishes drug use per
se. As a result, the prosecutors are in fact seeking to have the judiciary create a new crime of
drug use, and then only for one group of people-pregnant women." Lynn M. Paltrow,




knowledge. 171 Rather, the argument is that women cannot be expected to
know that use of these substances during their pregnancies constitutes the
crime of child abuse, reckless endangerment, delivery of drugs to a minor,
or whichever other particular crime is alleged in a given prosecution, as
none of these crimes are established by statutes explicitly governing the
conduct of pregnant women with regard to their fetuses.172 In addition, as
one state court has pointed out, "it is inflicting intentional or wanton injury
upon the child that makes the conduct criminal under the child abuse
statutes, not the criminality of the conduct per se."'173 Thus the fair notice
analysis of these prosecutions should hinge not upon the pregnant woman's
knowledge of the illegality of her drug use, but rather upon whether or not
the effect of that drug use on her fetus is within the purview of the statute.
One case that is particularly illuminating of the fair notice problem is
Reinesto v. State, in which the Court of Appeals of Arizona held that
Arizona's child abuse statute would not allow prosecution of a woman
whose newborn daughter experienced heroin withdrawal symptoms at
birth. 174 After conducting many of the same statutory interpretation and
legislative intent inquiries described above, the court considered the due
process implications of the case. 175 It found that an interpretation of the
child abuse statute sufficiently broad to cover prenatal drug use would
expand the statute to a point of unconstitutional vagueness and violate
constitutional due process requirements. 76 The court recognized that the
defendant could not have known that she was liable for child abuse as a
171 The Supreme Court has, however, "established the principle that it is cruel and
unusual punishment to punish an individual solely for his or her status as a drug offender."
Tiffany Lyttle, Note, Stop the Injustice: A Protest Against the Unconstitutional Punishment
of Pregnant Drug-Addicted Women, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 781, 782 (2006). As a
result, some have argued that "a State's punishment of a drug-addicted woman for her
actions during pregnancy violates the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause because the State is penalizing the woman for her status as a drug addict." Id. at 783.
172 See, e.g., State v. Wade, 232 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (arguing that "the
mother is already subject to prosecution for such unlawful activity, and the only purpose of
allowing additional pregnancy-related charges would be to protect the interest of the
fetus .... [T]he logic of allowing such prosecutions would be extended to cases involving
smoking, alcohol ingestion, the failure to wear seatbelts, and any other conduct that might
cause harm to a mother's unborn child"). Contra State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 176
(S.C. 2003) ("[l]t is common knowledge that use of cocaine during pregnancy can harm the
viable unborn child. Given these facts, we do not see how [McKnight] can claim she lacked
fair notice that her behavior constituted child endangerment .... ).
173 Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 283 (Ky. 1993).
174 Reinesto v. State, 894 P.2d 733, 734 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).




result of her conduct during her pregnancy, because the child abuse statute
as written did not include harm done to fetuses.177
Courts have often combined their statutory interpretation and fair
notice arguments to hold that an unambiguous child abuse statute cannot be
expanded to encompass the acts of pregnant women, as in one case where
the Court of Appeals of Georgia stated that "[t]he unambiguous words of a
criminal statute are not to be altered by judicial construction so as to punish
one not otherwise within its reach."' 178 Other courts have decided that such
prosecutions are impermissible as the result of a statutory analysis alone,
and have declined to reach the constitutionally complex fair notice
question.179  This suggests that the fair notice argument may be a good
second line of defense. In cases where the court cannot decide, or declines
to decide, a given case on purely statutory grounds, it may be helpful to
provide the court with this strong basis upon which to find a prosecution
constitutionally impermissible.
B. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS AS A BARRIER TO
PROSECUTION
In 2001, Regina McKnight was convicted by a South Carolina jury of
homicide by child abuse after giving birth to a stillborn child and after
having admitted to use of crack cocaine during her pregnancy. 80 McKnight
was twenty-two years old, homeless, and had an I.Q. of seventy-two.1 8 She
consented to drug tests of both her system and that of her fetus without
knowing that such tests could expose her to prosecution. 182  The South
17 Id. at 734.
178 State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 34-35 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (holding the state statute
prohibiting the delivery and distribution of cocaine could not be extended to transmission of
cocaine metabolites to a fetus).
179 See, e.g., State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210, 1225 (Haw. 2005) ("Inasmuch as our
holding-that Aiwohi's prosecution for the offense of manslaughter is unsupported by the
plain language of the HPC-is dispositive, it is unnecessary to address Aiwohi's remaining
constitutional arguments.").
180 For a very sympathetic summary of the facts, see Dana Page, Note, The Homicide by
Child Abuse Conviction of Regina McKnight, 46 HOw. L.J. 363, 365-70 (2003). For the
South Carolina Supreme Court's take on the facts of the case, see State v. McKnight, 576
S.E.2d 168, 171 (S.C. 2003). Feminist commentators have placed McKnight's prosecution
in a broader policy context, focusing on her status as a "black, homeless, crack-addicted
mother of three children" and arguing that "the state in McKnight exploits the unique
vulnerability accompanying pregnancy in order to regulate and punish a particular stratum of
women for perceived deviance." Shalini Bhargava, Note, Challenging Punishment and
Privatization: A Response to the Conviction of Regina McKnight, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 513, 513-14 (2004).
181 Page, supra note 180, at 365, 367.
182 Id. at 366.
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Carolina Supreme Court upheld McKnight's conviction on several grounds,
but relied heavily on its holdings in a prior series of cases that had
expanded the definition of "person" and "child" throughout the South
Carolina code to include viable fetuses. 183 The court argued that "the fact
that the legislature was well aware of this Court's opinion in Whitner, 84 yet
failed to omit 'viable fetus' from the statute's applicability, is persuasive





Although the court declined to consider McKnight's equal protection
arguments-she had not raised these issues in the lower courts, thereby
failing to preserve them for appeal-they nonetheless form the basis of
another strong line of defense for women facing unconstitutional
prosecutions resulting from their drug use during pregnancy. 18 6 McKnight
made three main claims in support of the argument that her prosecution
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: "(1) it
unlawfully distinguishes between pregnant and non-pregnant persons; (2) it
discriminates based on gender by subjecting women to enhanced penalties;
and most importantly, (3) it discriminates based on race."' 187 As is the case
with the fair notice constitutional arguments discussed above, most courts
that have been confronted with this argument have chosen to decide in favor
of the women challenging their prosecutions on statutory grounds before
reaching the constitutional grounds. 1
88
The South Carolina Supreme Court revisited McKnight's equal
protection claims in 2008, in the context of reviewing and reversing a denial
of her petition for post-conviction relief.189 The court reversed the lower
court's decision denying McKnight relief on a number of evidentiary and
ineffective assistance of counsel grounds.'9" The court again rejected her
"' See, e.g., McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 173-75.
184 For further analysis of the Whitner decision, see supra notes 156-164 and
accompanying text.
185 McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 175.
186 Id. at 177. But see Page, supra note 180, at 397 ("McKnight made a number of
constitutionally based pre-trial motions to dismiss her case, all of which were denied.").
187 Page, supra note 180, at 398-99.
188 See, e.g., Starks v. State (In re Unborn Child), 18 P.3d 342, 348 (Okla. 2001)
(declining to reach the constitutional issues after dismissing the case on legislative intent
grounds).
189 McKnight v. State, 661 S.E.2d 354 (S.C. 2008).
190 In addition to her equal protection claims, McKnight claimed that her original
"counsel was ineffective in her preparation of McKnight's defense through expert
testimony." Id. at 357. She also argued that her counsel had failed to "investigate medical
evidence contradicting the State's experts' testimony on the link between cocaine and
stillbirth .... Id. at 360. The court also held that "counsel's failure to introduce the
autopsy report into evidence was deficient and that this deficiency... was prejudicial to
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equal protection claims, however, holding that her original counsel had not
been ineffective for "failing to move to dismiss the charges on the grounds
that the disparity between the sentences for criminal abortion and homicide
by child abuse violates the Equal Protection Clause."'1 91 The court
ultimately reversed McKnight's conviction, 192 but did not address any of the
problematic language in its previous decisions, which has made South
Carolina an outlier among the states in its allowance of criminal child abuse
prosecutions of pregnant women who use drugs. Instead, the court argued
that the statute under which she had been prosecuted had been "wrongfully
enforced almost as a strict liability rule; prosecutors never proved that
McKnight's drug use caused the miscarriage." 193 Thus, even though Regina
McKnight was able to secure some measure of justice, South Carolina
remains at odds with the usual jurisprudence governing drug use by
pregnant women.
Many of the commentators who have written on the subject of equal
protection claims in the drug-use-during-pregnancy context have addressed
with particular strength the implicit racism in the manner in which these
prosecutions are conducted. 194  Indeed, the majority of women who are
targeted for prosecution as a result of their drug use during pregnancy are
black.195 Some commentators have hypothesized that women of color are
McKnight." Id. at 365. With respect to the statute under which she had been charged,
McKnight's petition for post-conviction relief argued that her counsel "was ineffective in
failing to object to the trial court's charge on the measure of criminal intent required for
conviction under the Homicide by Child Abuse (HCA) statute." Id. at 361. The South
Carolina Supreme Court ruled in McKnight's favor on these three claims, thus reversing the
lower court's denial of post-conviction relief. Id. at 360-62. The court ruled against
McKnight's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on other claims, however, related to
her burden of proof, to the possibility of requesting a jury charge on involuntary
manslaughter, and to the counsel's failure to argue that McKnight had not intended harm to
her fetus. Id. at 363.
19' Id. at 363.
192 Regina McKnight, Victory at Long Last, NAT'L ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN,
http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/blog/2008/05/regina-mcknight-victory-aLlon.php
(May 12, 2008, 03:14 EST).
193 Michele Goodwin, Prosecuting the Womb, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1657 (2008).
194 See Roberts, supra note 21, at 1450-56 (arguing that under Supreme Court precedent,
a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose could be made by pointing out "the disparity
between the percentage of defendants who are [b]lack and the percentage of pregnant
substance abusers who are [b]lack").
195 A 1992 report prepared for the American Civil Liberties indicated that 70% of targets
of prosecution whose race could be identified were women of color. LYNN M. PALTROW,
ACLU, CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AGAINST PREGNANT WOMEN: NATIONAL UPDATE AND
OVERVIEW (1992), available at http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/file/1992%20State-
by-State%20Case%2OSummary.pdf. For a possible explanation underlying the racial
disparity, see Roberts, supra note 21, at 1424 (theorizing that "[p]oor [b]lack women have
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selected for prosecution because of the racial disparity in media accounts,
which focus primarily on the use of illegal drugs by minorities, especially
minority women. 196  It is also noteworthy that while there is no clear
evidence that crack is substantially more harmful to a developing fetus than
any other illegal drug (or than legal ones such as alcohol), criminal
prosecutions of pregnant drug addicts focus on crack users, who are
predominately poor and African American. 97  Thus, advocates can argue
that these prosecutions have a discriminatory effect and purpose, even if
that purpose can only be shown by the disparate impact they have upon
women of color.
Scholars have also argued that the prosecution of pregnant women for
child abuse violates equal protection rights in a broad sense, as a form of
pregnancy discrimination, and should be analyzed under at least an
intermediate scrutiny standard, as particularly likely to offend constitutional
requirements of gender equality.198 There is a large body of scholarship
pointing to the constitutional conflict that arises when fetal rights are
advanced at the expense of pregnant women's rights.1 99 A fair survey of the
literature is beyond the scope of this Comment, particularly since, as
previously noted, courts will generally decline to reach constitutional
arguments that are presented in a challenge to such a prosecution.
Advocates for pregnant women should be aware, however, that they may
find many allies in the broader reproductive justice movement, and that
criminal child abuse prosecutions of pregnant women are but one way in
which the growing conflict between conceptions of fetal rights and
women's rights manifests itself.
been selected for punishment as a result of an inseparable combination of their gender, race,
and economic status").
196 DeVille & Kopelman, supra note 6, at 338.
197 Sandy, supra note 80, at 686; see also Okie, supra note 83 (discussing expert
opinions related to the lack of long-term negative effects of prenatal cocaine use on child
development).
'9' Julie B. Ehrlich, Breaking the Law by Giving Birth: The War on Drugs, the War on
Reproductive Rights, and the War on Women, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 381, 382-
83 (2008).
199 See, e.g., id.; April L. Cherry, Roe's Legacy: The Nonconsensual Medical Treatment
of Pregnant Women and Implications for Female Citizenship, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 723, 724
(2004) (arguing that Roe's recognition of a "compelling state interest" in fetal life has "in
some ways led to the derogation of women's choices, women's autonomy, and,
consequently, women's citizenship"); Fentiman, supra note 75, at 540 (arguing that "'fetal
protection' efforts undermine women's health, limit women's ability to fully participate in
the economic life of the nation, and disproportionately affect the indigent and racial
minorities"); Nora Christie Sandstad, Pregnant Women and the Fourteenth Amendment: A
Feminist Examination of the Trend to Eliminate Women's Rights During Pregnancy, 26 LAW
& INEQ. 171, 172 (2008) (arguing that "[w]omen's constitutional rights are violated when the




Abuse of controlled substances by pregnant women is clearly
undesirable and certainly a public health problem. However, criminal
prosecutions of these women under state statutes designed to criminalize
child abuse or endangerment are not legally permissible, constitutional, or
wise. They also fail to achieve their stated policy intentions. Criminal
prosecutions cannot act as effective deterrents because women who wish to
seek treatment for their addictions lack access to effective and affordable
programs designed to assist them.200  They do not impose retributive
punishment on those who properly and morally deserve such punishment,
but instead target women on the basis of questionable and unconstitutional
stereotypes of race and gender.20 1  Finally, criminal prosecutions with
resultant incarceration fail to improve maternal or fetal health outcomes,
and may actually wreak serious harm.
As a result of these policy considerations and of their own statutory
analysis and legislative intent inquiries, most courts that have addressed this
problem have chosen to defer the consideration of appropriate solutions to
the state legislatures. Courts have also demonstrated an awareness of the
significant constitutional issues at stake in these prosecutions, including the
requirements of fair notice and equal protection of the laws,
notwithstanding their reluctance to address such issues directly. The results
of this survey of court decisions offer reason for optimism, as it is clear that
advocates for prosecuted pregnant women have a wide variety of possible
ways in which to challenge the impermissible and unconstitutional
prosecutions of their clients.
200 See Linden, supra note 67, at 131-34 (noting that few drug treatment programs
currently accept pregnant women, and those that do fail to meet the child care, prenatal care,
and other needs of women struggling with both addictions and high-risk pregnancies); see
also Eckenwiler, supra note 60, at 91 (explaining that "there are many reasons why women
avoid those services that have nothing do to with a lack of desire to stop using," including
distrust of the medical establishment and fear of losing custody of their children).
201 See Eckenwiler, supra note 60, at 94-95 (commenting on the "hostility aimed at
women who diverge from ideals of femininity and motherhood established by groups with
greater social power, hostility directed with a particular vengeance at women of color").
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